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IN THB PALAOE 01' NOBLllIS
UNEXPECTEDLY and unannounced,probably out of consideration forthe police forces of Europe. the last
World Congress of the Comintem met in
Moscow on July 25, 1935, at half past
seven in the evening. For almost a full
month. until late in the evening of
August 20. the "General Staff of the
World Revolution," as it was called. sat
in the clasaical Hall of Columns of the
former Pa1aoe of Nobles. Over the plat-
form on which the presiding oommittee
of the Congreea was enthroned. hung four·
huge portraits: Marx, Engels, Lenin. and
Stalin. In the auditorium sat 510 dele-
gatee repreeenting 65 national groupe.
oalled eeotions. of the Comintem. In
front, on the presiding committee's
right, were the Communists of Asia;
further back, those of Western
Europe; and behind them. those of
Eastem Europe. To the left of the
Chairman, starting from the front: the
United States, Latin America, the British •
Dominions, the colonies, and Germany.
Communist leaders from all over the
world sat on the presiding committee
of the Congress. Among them were
two women, a Spaniard and a NegreBBf
Among the representatives of the Soviet
Union was Stalin. There were roars of
applaU8e when he was elected Chairman.
Although he did not make a single speech
and was often absent during the Be88ions,
he dominated the Congress. There was
hardly a speaker who failed to extol him
as the "Leader of the World Proletariat."
or as the "Leader of the World Revoluj
tion." Since I,.enin's death, this was th~
first Congress at which one and the same
man participated unequivocally as the
leader of the Soviet Union as well as the
leader of the Comintem. And the fact'
'.
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that the famous Bulgarian revolutionary
Dimitroff W&8 later made only Secretary
General of the new Executive Com-
mittee of the Comintern (EKKI) and not
Presideni (which had been the former
title), W&8 doubtle88 intended to indicate
that only Stalin was entitled to the office
of President; since, for obvious reasons,
he could not a88ume this office, the only
title that remained for Dimitroff W&8 that
of Secretary General.
The Communist Parties of the world
represented at the Congress were divided
into two "ruling" parties (Soviet Union
and Soviet China), fifteen legal ones
(Great Britain, Ireland, France, the USA,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Nor-
way, Sweden, Iceland, Switzerland, South
Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Costa
Rica), and five semilegal ones, with the
remainder all being illegal. The total
number of members of the Communist
Parties including the Soviet Union was
given as 3.1 million (1928: 1.7 million);
of these, however, there were only 760,000
(1928: 450,000) outside of the Soviet
Union.
TWOFOLD CAPITAL
The aim of Bolshevism as it has been
clearly expre88Cd in the teachings of
Marx, Lenin, and Stalin is to organize a
World Revolution and then to establish
a World Soviet Union after the pattern
• of the present Soviet Union. At present,
Bolshevism has at its disposal two weapons
for attaining this goal: a state-the
Soviet Union, and a world organization-
the Comintern. The Comintern, the or-
ganization of all Communist Parties in
the world, is al80 known by the name of
the "Third International." This name
serves to distinguish it from other in-
ternational revolutionary organizations
such &8 the short-lived "First Interna-
tional" of Karl Marx, the "Second In-
ternational" of the Social-Democr-atio
Parties, which is today practically non-
uiatent, and the "Fourth International"
created by Trotsky.
Moacow is the capital of the Soviet
Union &8 well &8 of the Comintern. But,
although both of these are working
toward the same goal, i.e., World Revo-
lution, officially they have nothing to do
with one another and go out of their way
to demonstrate their independence of
each other. Actually, the central
management of the Soviet Union as well
&8 of the Comintem are in the same
hands. For, just as the Communist
Party predominates in the Soviet Union,
so the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union holds the leading position in
the Comintem. This W&8 even offioially
laid down in the first statutes of the
Comintem, which were accepted by its
second World Congress in 1920. Para-
graph 8 of these statutes •reads: "The
main share of the work of the EKKI is
to be borne by the Party of that country
in which the EKKl flhall have its
seat according to the decision of the
World Congress." From the very
beginning, this country W&8 the Soviet
Union.
Incidentally, there were still 80me dele-
gates at that second Congre88 who had
the courage to oppose the subjection of
the Comintern to the will of Moscow. A
Dutch delegate, for instance, said: "While
it would seem that an international
EKKI is being formed, actually an cn-
larged RU8sian executive committee is
being created .... But then this should
be openly said, and it should not be at-
tempted to create the impression that we
are going to have an international
EKKI," Now for a long time no one
has dared to complain and, although that
Paragraph 8 has, for tactical reuoDI,
long disappeared into oblivion, there can
be even leas doubt of the leading position
of the Soviet Union in the Comintem
today than at a time when this candid
paragraph atill existed.
TOO JU.lfY SB0BJft'8t
The reader might ask: What sense is
there in studying these questions and in
citing protocols and statutes when all
available documents and statements are
obviously designed to throw dust iJl the
eye8 of the world and to distract its at-
tention from the decisive events! We
do not share this opinion. Of course,
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there'is enough that is only of declamatory
significance as, for instance, the oft-
repeated· contention that the Soviet
Union has nothing to do with the Comin-
tern. But all this can eaBily be eliminated
if one knows how to read. And the rest
is to be taken seriously.
. Those who have studied Marxism-
Leninism know that its leaders do not
believe in intuition or instinct but make
a.n decisions dependent on tedious "analy-
ses," on cumbersome "theses, anti-, and
syntheses" and arrive at them usually only
after endless "discussions." Even Stalin,
with all his brutal use of force and
ceaseless "purges" within the Party,
believes, like all materialists, that, by
applying Marxist methods, the course of
the world and its individual phases can be
calculated scientifically.
This is equally true of th~ Comintern,
whose congresses and resolutions are, so
to say, the primers of all Communist
functionaries. EspeciaUy their detailed
tactical inStructions are meant very
seJ,io1'18ly. These, as well as the speeches
and ~lutions made at the congresses
and me~tings, may have been touched
up for publication; but the actual
speeches can hardly have been any
more frank than their printed versions.
The wealth of printed material available
contains more than the imagination of
even the bitterest enemies of the Comin-
tern could have concocted. Outlines and
methods, strategy and tactics of the
Comintern, lie clearly before anyone who
takes the trouble to read attentively the
p:ublished stenographic reports and
resolutions.
. The most important material is the
stenographic reports of the World Con-
gresses. But it is also possible to follow
the development of the Comintem during
the long 'pauses between them. The
EKKI, which is responsible for managing
the Comintem during the years between
World Congresses, holds plenary sessions
during this time, and there is copious
p~ted material in RU88ian and partly in
other languages available on the results
of these eeesions.
COUNTING ON SOVIET EUBOPB
(FInt Period)
The leading role of the Soviet Union
in the Comintern and the latter's de-
pendence on Moscow have resulted in the
interests and demands of the Soviet
Union having the strongest possible in-
fluence on the tactical attitude of the
Comintem. Hence each of the variol,18
periods in the development of the Soviet
Union (with which we dealt in the article
"Bolshevism and Its Pedigree," in our
issue of October 1941) also left its mark
on the Comintem.
During the first period, which lasted
from the founding of the Comintem in
March 1919 up to March 1921, the minds
of the men in the Kremlin were dominated
by two ideas. First, the Communist
Revolution in the most important Euro-
pean states seemed, in those years, to be
within reach, in fad, a question of weeks.
Zinovyev, at that time the President of
the Comintem, wrote in the first number
of the magazine Communist International:
"At the moment of writing these lines,
the 'Third International' has already
three Soviet repnblics as its foundation
stones-in Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria.
But no one would be surprised if, at the
moment when these lines appear in 'print,
we . have not three but six or more
Soviet republics . . . . The vict.ory of
Communism in Gel many is inevitable ....
In another year we shall already begin to
forget that there was a battle for Com-
mUIllim raging in Europe, for in a year
all Europe will be Communist." Even
in 1920, when the second World Congress
met without the hopes of the first one
having been realized, Zinovyev would
only admit that he had slightly mis-
calculated the tempo and that "actually
not one year but two or three years are
necessary before all of Europe is a Soviet
Europe."
Secondly, the Bolsheviks could not,
gravely threatened as they were by enemies
within and without, imagine that the
Russian Revolution would be able to
succeed alone and without the support
of revolutions in other important Euro-
pean ·states. Even Lenin, who regarded
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the situation more soberly than any of
the others, said at that time: "It is an
abeolute truth that we shall perish
without the GermlLll revolution." They
were still entirely under the in6.uence of
the ideas of Karl Marx's Oommuni8t
Manifesto, according to which the Rev-
olution W88 to break out 8imultaneo'U8ly
in 8everal advanud counlnu. And Rus-
sia W88 not only alone but also the most
backward of all the European powers.
Under the infiuence of these two ideas,
no one in Moscow, in that first period of
"Storm and Stress," 88 Zinovyev later
called it, thought of anything else except
the struggle against the capitalist world
and of the imminent World Revolution.
At that time, the Soviet Union and the
Comintern were one and the same thing,
without even the slighte8t inner con-
tradiction.
STALIN VB. TROTSKY
(8«clad Period)
The second period (1921/28) was under
the sign of the gradual stabilization within
both world camps. Moscow had to dis-
cover to its surprise that the revolutionary
wave had come to a standstill in Europe,
indeed, that it W88 even rolling back
, again; furthermore, that the Bolshevist
regime in Soviet Russia was beginning to
consolidate after its victory over the
Anglo-American intervention and the
counterrevolution of the Whites, in spite
of no help ha.ving been forthcoming
through European revolutions. This real-
ization caused the Soviet Government to
establish normal relations with the outer
world, beginning with the at that time
sensational trade agreement with England
in the spring of 1921. The Bolsheviks had
to adjust themselves to the idea that
things would take longer than they had
imagined.
This tum of events was a.lso evident'in
the policy of the Comintem. The most
important task of the third World Con-
gress, which met in the summer of 1921,
was to bring the new situation in world
politics into harmony with the principles
of the Comintem. Trotsky pronounced
what was from then on to be a leitmotiv
of the Comintem: "The funtlameftltd
principies of the Third International. re-
main unshaken, but their practical ap-
plication must be made to aocord with
the new conditions."
The Soviet Union, which now saw the
possibility of continuing to exist even as
the sole Soviet republio, was no longer
dependent to the same extent as during
the first period on the European revolution.
At this third Congress it was stated for the
first time by a German delegate that, in
these circumstances, the interests of the
Soviet Union might confiict with those
of the proletarians of the rest of the
world.
In the autumn of 1924 a conflict began
which W88 to be decisive for the further
development of the Soviet Union and
consequently for its role in the Comin-
tern: the confiiot between Stalin with his
slogan of "Socialism in one country" and
Trotsky, the prophet of the "Permanent
Revolution." At the fifteenth party
meeting of the Communist Party. of the
Soviet Union (winter 1927/28), the battle
was decided in Stalin's favor, Trotsky,
who from that time on accused Stalin
of being a "Fasoist," W88 exiled. Stalin
had won, and with him the theory
that it was possible to build up socialism
in one country without first carrying out
the Revolution in other oountries (as
Trotsky had been demanding).
"SOOIALISM IN ONE OOUNTBY"
('l'bIrd Pertod)
The practioal consequences of this
change beoame apparent in the third
period (1928/29 to 1933). The Soviet Union
entered upon the policy of the Five Year
Plans, the carrying out of which swal-
lowed up huge quantities of energy
and money, which were in that way with-
drawn from directly furthering the World
Revolution, although, of course, the de-
sire for a revolution in the rest of the
world remained unchanged. For it goes
without saying that both for. Stalin's
"Sooialism in one oountry" and for
Trotsky's "Permanent Revolution" the
World Revolution was the final.aim. It
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was only in the means to reach it that
they disagreed.
What makes this third period peculiar
is that, on the one hand, the interests of
the Soviet Union demanded the continua-
tion of the Five Year Plan policy, which
had purely domestio aims, and the
consolidation of peaceful relations with
the outer world (the peak of Soviet
foreign trade was reached in this period),
while on the other hand, as a consequence
of the world economio crisis, good oppor-
tunities for revolution in the rest of the
world were offered to the Comintem.
The question arose: Which will gain the
upper hand in this situation, the concrete
interest of the Soviet UnioD in domestic
reconstruotion and pacification of a coun-
try convulsed by agrioultural collectiviza-
tion, or the desire of the Comintem to
make use of its opportunities for revolu-
tion in Europe?
The twelfth plenary mceting of the
EKKI took place in the summer of 1932.
At this meeting it became amazingly
apparent that the egoistic demands of
the Soviet Union, whose development was
beginning to follow its own laws, had
won the day against those of the Comin-
tem. The quintessenoe of the whole
meeting was that, in spite of the rev-
olutionary situation throughout the
world, it was not yet a question of begin-
ning the fight for revolution there but
only of carefully preparing it. Indeed,
the German Communist leader Thalmann
even tumed violently against the "Trot-
skyist theory," according to which the
Red Army was to assist the German
Communist Party, and he called this
theory a "counterrevolutiona.ry provoca-
tion." This attitude did not meet with
sympathy on the part of all delegates,
and Manuilsky, at that time the nominal
leader of the Comintem, had even to
defend himself against the accusation
that it meant a renunciation of World
Revolutionary ideas.
Ercoli, an Italian and one of the smartest
brains of the Comintem, expressed it very
clearly at the seventh World Congress,
when he spoke about the contradiotion
existing at that time between the Soviet
Union's polioy of alliance with France
and Czech08lovakia and the Comintern's
efforts at undermining those same two
countries. He said: "The identioal
nature of their [Le., the Soviet Union's
and the Comintem's] goals does not
on any &OCOunt mean that there
must, at every given moment, in ,aU
actions and all questions, be complete
agreement between the tactics of the
Communist Parties which are still fight-
ing for power [Le., in France and Czecho~
slovakia] and the concrete tactioal
measures of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which has already
established its power in the Soviet
Union." It could not have been said
more clearly that Moscow was at that
time not yet interested in the outbreak of
European revolutions. The price paid by
Moscow for its much-needed peaoe was
the bloodless seizure of power of National-
Socialism in Germany sL'( months later,
an event which oould never be made up
for by the Communist world movement.
"ANTI-FASCISM"
(Fourth Period)
That was the beginning of the fo~
period. At first sight it seems to re-
semble the second. Again we can o:bserve
a stabilization of the Soviet Union and
restabilization of the rest of the wor1c;i
through having overcome the lowest
point of the world economio crisis anc;i
through the growth of a strong Ger,.
many. Hence we should expect the
same picture as in the second period:
the desire of the Soviet Union for un-
disturbed development and the decreased
possibility for European revolutions in
the face of the growing economio strengt,h
of the capitalist world should both a4d
up to a comparatively passive attitude
toward the problem of World Revolution.
Actually the opposite was the case.
The seventh Congress, .whioh ga,ve ex-
pression to this period, was a signal for
attack, an attack which-as we shall see-
assumed a different shape from hitherto
but nevertheless an attack whioh was
inoomp&rably more violent and deter-
mined than ever since the very firs~
years.
THE TROJAN HORSE
When the Communists speak of 0.
United Front, they mean a collaboration
of the workers of a oountry. In this
fourth period, however, this was not con-
sidered enough, and the "Anti-Fascist
Popular Front" was proclaimed, in other
words, a collaboration of workers with
other classes' Buch ~ farmers, the
middle classes, intellectu8Js, etc.
1
As long as the Comintem was fighting
mainly Jor the Communist Revolution, it
was difficult to recruit possible alli~
under one standard. At that time, the
Communist Parties in the rest of the
world were frankly intolerant-"sectar~
ian," as they contemptuously say today
-and wanted only unconditionally de~
voted supporters. But from the moment
when the main battle was directed
again8t Fascism, the gaining of aiIres
became much easier, since people have
always agreed more readily in opposition,
Moreover, developments had clearly shown
what possibilities were offered National-
Socialism, because, instead of limiting
itself in "sectarian" fashion to certain
classes of the population, it had appealed
to the entire nation. This had made a.
deep impression on Moscow, and
Dimitroff said cynically that one should
not mind learning from the enemy if one
could tW1St"hiS neck better by such means.
So the tactics of the United Front
became the chief weapon of the anti-
Fascist fight. Its idea is not new, for
it appeared as early as 1922. At that
time, however, they were only interested
in a. United Front Jrom below, in alliance
with the individual social-democratio
workers, since in au organized union
from ab01;e, that is, with the Social-
Democratic Parties themselves, who were
then at the height of their power, the
Communists would have always beeri
worst off. After the collapse of the
Social-Democratic Parties in Germany
and Austria and the general weakening
of Social-Democracy, this obstacle had
disappeared, and thus the United Front
from above was also demanded now.
The' decisive event which deeply in-
fluenced the entire policy of the Comin-
tern and, which brought about this
change was the seizure of power by
National-Socialism in Germany. For the
firet time in many years, Bolshevism felt
itself to be on the defensive. Neither
capitalism nor democracy had been bul-
warks against Bol"hevism, let alone weap-
ons of attack. National-Socialism was
something different. Since the summer
of 1933, the sharp contrast between
National-Socialist Gel many and the Bol-
shevist Soviet Union had been growing
more apparent every day. The collapse
of the Communist Party in Germany,
which had first only been regarded as a
"loss in tempo," was gradually recognized
in its full significance. The fear of
"Fascism," as National-Socialism was
called ,in Moscow in order not to use the
word "Socialism," and the hate of
Adolf Bitler's Germany, are the new,
distinguishing marks of the fourth
period. All the old catchwords gave
way to the central motto of "Anti-
Fascism." Thus it came about that
Moscow as the capital of the Soviet
Union began in its foreign policy to
assemble all the anti-German powers
(France, Czechoslovakia, the Little En-
tente, etc.), while at the samc time
Moscow as the capital of the Comintem
mobilized all anti-Fascist energies within
, the various states of the world-a two-
edged policy which was to have very
grave consequences.
In 'addition to this, the policy of
"Sociali~m in one country" was beginning
to bear" fruit. For the first time, the
Soviet Union felt more or less secure,
domestically as well as from a military
point of view. It believed itself to have
advanced beyond the stage at which, be-
cause of its inner weakness, it had to keep
outward peace at any price. The develop-
ment of its economics and its army, as
well as its alliance with France and
OLechoslovakia, permitted Moscow to con-
sider the pOssibility of a war more calmly.
It was hoped that, if war came, it would
not· be a war of the Soviet Union alone
against Germany but a general world
conflagration.
• 'J/UNITED FRONT
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, ·In order to create this popular front,
.two methods were recommended. The
first was that of the Trojan Horse.
.,Dimitroff, the new myseee, expounded
this method in his report at the seventh
World Congress, when he said, concerning
the non-COmmunist maaa organizations:
''They can and must be our legal and eemi·
legal field of activity, where we contact the
maaees. In order fully to utilize theee
poeeibilitiee, the Communiate must, once and
tor aU, rid themeelvea of the prejudice that
aueh activity is not fitting for a revolutionary
worker or that it is unworthy of him. You
will recall the old legend of the capture of
Troy. Troy had protected itself against the
attacking army by an insuperable waU, and
the attacking army, which had had heavy
108888, could not gain victory-until it suc-
ceeded, with the aid of the Trojan Horae,
in penetrating into the city, into the very
heart of the enemy. We revolutionary
workers must not be ashamed of employing
the ll&Dle tactics against our Fascist enemy."
The second method was that of "partial
demands." According to the belief that
he who offers much, offers something
to many, the individual strata or groups
within each people were to be baited
and won over through concessions to a
part of their demands. such as democracy.
religious freedom. prevention of war, etc.
By these means, all forces that were anti-
Fascist, no matter for what reason. were
to be co-ordinated and brought under the
systematic, uniform will of the Com-
munists.
THE SLOGAN OF OPPORTUNISM
These two methods represent the most
extreme opportwlism of tacijcs imagi-
nable. Ercoli found what ClUl be caUed
a classic formula for it in his speech at
.the last World Congress: "If it is neces-
sary, in order to reach the people, to
l'peak a new language, discard bare
formulas, destroy old plans, change the
methods of work, reshape the forms of
organization-well then, we shall do 80
without the least hesitation."
This policy reached its climax barely
one year later in the formation of the
Popular Front Government in France
(June 5, 1936) and in the Spanish Civil
War (outbreak: July 18. 1936).
In this ekillful maneuvering,: MoeoQw
finally faced the favorable constel1&tion,in
which France, of all nations the one most
threatened internally by the Comintern,
waa allied with the Soviet Union in her
foreign polioy and, as a result, was crippled
in her power of resistance against the
Comintern threat. Nevertheless. it re-
mained an irreconcilable contrad.4ltion.
in spite of all Ercoli's dialectics, that the
Soviet Union was striving for a strength-
ening of the military power· of ite
allies France and ~hoelovakia while
the Comintem was PUl'8uing the goal. of
strengthening the Frenoh and ~eoho:"
slovakian Communist Parties, which were
undermining the military power of Franoe
and Czechoslovakia.
The better this shortsighted policy
with its double bottom was functioning,
the faster did it hurtle toward its bank-
ruptcy. The catastrophe developed simul-'
taneously in Spain and France.
In Spain, the formation of a Popular
Front Government led to the outbreak
of the Spanish Civil War in the summer
of 1936. Constant inner friction within
the camp of the Popular Front, largely
a result of the claims to leadership on the
part of the Communist Party and the
interference of Soviet adviaers in Spanish
affairs, led to the outbreak of a civil war
within the Popular Front and contributed
to General Franco's victory in 1939.
In France, the Popular Front ruled-
with interruptions-from the formation
of the first Blum Cabinet on June 5, 1936,
until Daladier's break with the Com-
munists on October 4, 1938. This period,
so disastrous for France, resulted in total
disorganization. Strikes, social strife, the
introduction of the 40-hour week, and
numerous other measures, weakened
France 'to such a degree that she was
plunged into a catastrophe in 19.0.
1939 TO 1942
cWth UI4 8lxth 1'eriodI)
The fifth period in the development of
the Comintem came when the Soviet
Government, alarmed by the strengthen-
ing of the Rome-Berlin Axis as a result
of Franco's victory and the weakening
-~------,-,..---------
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Front," except that the emphasis of the
Bolshevist activity is directed at Grea~
Britain and the USA instead of at France
and Czeohoelovakia, and that the Sovie~
Union, as the ally of the former two
powers, poeeesses far greater possibilities
for subversive activities than ever before.
This issue will reach our readers on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of one of
the strangest, bloodiest, and most fateful
events in history-that of the Bolsheviks'
accession to power in Russia. Shortly
afterwards the Comintem was founded.
Thus the two fists of Bolshevism, Soviet
Russia and the Comintem, have been
working for a quArter of a century, some-
times side by side and sometimes on
separate roads, towards their one goal-
the Bolshevization of the world.
During the last sixteen months, the
armies of Europe have swept Bolshevism
from its richest possessions in European
Russia, and its hold over the rest has
been seriously shaken. But in watching
the spectacular successes of Europe
against the USSR, the world, especially
the so-called democratic countries in-
'cluding India and Chungking, should
not forget that Bolshevism has one more
weapon, the Comintern, which. is doing
its utmost to find compensation for every
inch of ground lost in Europe by gains
in Asia or Amerioa.
For true Bolsheviks, Russia is only a
name. One day they may call the last
twenty-five years "the Russian episode
of Bolshevism." For them, the death
of millions of Russians is not to be
regretted if it means that they can shift
the Red Flag from the Kremlin to
Bombay or Pittsburgh, and if the Don
and the Volga are replaced by the Thames,
the Ganges, and the Hudson.
of France, signed a pact with Germany
on August 23,1939. A few days later, the
·war broke out between Germany and the
western democracies. From this moment
on, it was the design of the Bolshevist
leaders to keep the Soviet Union out of
the war for the time being, in order to
be able later on to lead the intact Red
Army against a Europe weakened through
fratricidal warfare and through the sub-
versive activities of the Comintem.
This was a time of great difficulty for
the Comintem. After years of Popular
Front propaganda, the Communists in the
democratio countries had the thankless
task of explaining the sudden desertion
of the Soviet Union from the democratio
camp, the brutal attack upon Finland,
and the procedure against Poland and
the Baltic States. This strain was too
much for the Popular Front. It lost face
and power everywhere. The countless
sympathizers deserted again. Only
thoee who were ready unconditionally
to carry out any gyrations ordered by
Moscow could be kept in line.
The development of the war progressed
much faster than Moscow had hoped.
Instead of the European powers slowly
wearing each other out in long-drawnout
struggles, the German Army and its
allies quickly overran the entire Euro-
pean continent, being aided in this by
the disintegration of its enemies through
the Comintern. After the completion of
the Balkan campaign, only England re-
mained. The Soviet Union had to hurry
if it did not want to see its last possible
ally in Europe against Germany disappear.
On June 22, 1941, Germany forestalled
Moscow in its plans.
And thus began the sixth, the present
period in the development of the Comin-
tern. In many ways, it resembles the
fourth period, that of the "Popular
• • •
